1989 April-July Tiananmen Square:The Legacy And Repercussions For U.S-China Relations

Postscript Of 1989: Happily Ever After?
In the aftermath of Tiananmen Square and after the initial sanctions imposed by the US, President Bush promised to review other aspects of the US-China relationship. But further sanctions were not imposed. Moreover, at no time did the administration identify clearly what the US expected from the Chinese government if sanctions were to be lifted. The administration also began undercutting the sanctions it did impose almost immediately.

Despite the alleged ban on meetings between Chinese and US officials, in September, representatives from the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) met Chinese officials to discuss China's entrance into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). At that time, entry to GATT was a priority for the Chinese leadership and the meeting helped the Chinese gain a foothold in the GATT.

The ban on military sales was further tested in October, when the 42 Chinese military officers assigned to work on Project Peace Pearl, were permitted to resume work. The project was a $500 million program to upgrade Chinese fighter aircraft and the officers had been taken off the project at the time of the President's announced sanctions.

October also saw administration officials test the waters in Congress about the viability of resuming loans to China by multilateral development banks. House and Senate leaders, however, made clear their opposition to such a move. Additionally, the same month saw the new US ambassador to China, James Lilley, attend a major aeronautics show in Beijing in which a large number of military aircraft were displayed. Officials from Western European countries did not attend.

On December 20th President Bush waived a Congressional ban on the export of three communications satellites to China. The ban had been imposed by Senator Albert Gore. Secretary James Baker justified the sale, as being in the US national interest. According to a White House press statement, the sale represented $300 million worth of business for U.S. firms. The administration claimed they were civilian communications satellites, to be controlled after launch by companies based in Australia and Hong Kong. The sale would therefore be consistent with the President's sanctions and his determination to maintain commercial relations with China." [1]

The speed with which the Bush administration dismantled its own policy caught Congress off guard. Despite a flurry of Congressional activity on sanctions on China, legislation was not completely enacted before Congress adjourned in November 1989 for the year. Sanctions including a ban on arms sales, US satellite exports and police equipment, an end to nuclear cooperation, a ban on further liberalization of export controls, and a suspension of investment insurance by the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation were actually passed by the House and Senate, and a conference report was drafted and adopted by the House. This was done despite strong protests by the Bush administration. The bill finally allowed a presidential waiver of sanctions on the grounds of national interest. Due to a legislative technicality, the Senate failed to approve the conference report, and the bill languished.

Symbolically, the Bush administration's most important action toward China in 1989 was its decision to send a high-level delegation, including National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, to China on December 9th. The decision was made in absolute secrecy, echoing the secrecy with which the two met Deng in June. Congress was not consulted and the State Department's Asia Bureau was unaware of the plan. The meet’s highlight was the Administration’s gesture of extending a hand in friendship and the statement that the US hoped the Chinese would reciprocate. General Scowcroft also said, “In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces." The words were clearly meant to placate Beijing and to apologize for the rupture in ties imposed by Washington after Tiananmen Square, despite the lack of Chinese action in curbing human rights abuses.

Faced with a barrage of criticism, President Bush justified his decision by stating that he was looking for ways to find "common ground" with Beijing, and noted that "we have contacts with countries that have egregious records on human rights." Secretary Baker attempted to justify the mission by stating that human rights were on the agenda, and that the Chinese would have to meet the US’s attempts half way. But critics at that time pointed out that the repair of relations was on China’s terms. President Bush then made plain that the West should not expect any quick reciprocity from the Chinese, stating that it would take time before Beijing's full response could be evaluated.

But fifteen years later, in January 2005 the Chinese Government was wrestling with the question of how to pay its respects to Zhao Ziyang, the former CCP General Secretary purged in 1989 for refusing to endorse the military assault on the student protesters, without triggering an emotional debate about the Tiananmen incident. A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman defended the government, "The political disturbance and the problem of Zhao himself have already passed. What happened in 1989 reached its conclusion. The past 15 years have shown China's decision was correct. China's stability and development are in the interest of China and of the whole world,"[2] China never changed its stance on what happened the night of 3rd June and through June 4th 1989. Until the Communists are in the seat of power in China, Tiananmen Square will always be a rebellion and not a movement of the masses.
[1] Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Licensing of Communications Satellites for China, December 19,1989

[2] The Japan Times, Harvey Stockwin, Correspondent, Asian politics and International relations, January 31, 2005

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005

1989 April-July Tiananmen Square:The Legacy And Repercussions For U.S-China Relations

The Actions: Sanctions and Counter Sanctions
As news of the CCP’s brutal crushing of the pro-democracy demonstrators flowed in through the US Beijing Embassy, Intelligence and Media reports, the US Government did not rush to make a judgment. With a wait and watch approach, US Secretary of State James Baker, appeared on Cable News Network (CNN) and refused to hypothesize on the Administration’s potential reaction or on the consideration of sanctions. He said, “It would appear that there may be some violence being used here on both sides. Before we get into hypothetical situations, let's see how this most recent and extremely deplorable development unfolds. Let's see what happens over the course of the next few days before we start hypothesizing about what we might or might not do in the future."[1]

On June 5, 1989, a day after the main crackdown, President George Bush initiated the first US sanctions on China. First on the agenda was the suspension of all government-to-government military sales and commercial exports of weapons to China. The US sanctions entailed the embargo of ammunition and technical equipment and technology such as helicopters and spare parts to the Chinese. The sanction was stringent to the extent that it barred the sale of satellites from the US to China. The sanction also included nuclear material, facilities or components, goods or technology which could be used for nuclear explosive purposes or could help China build Atomic Energy projects. The sanction included the suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military Leaders.[2]

But on July 9, the Administration announced its decision to sell three Boeing jets to China, valued at $150 million. (A fourth aircraft was delivered in August.) The delivery had been halted, along with all other military sales, in June. The items were considered dual-use because their navigational equipment could be used for military purposes. The change in policy was justified by White House Chief of Staff John Sununu who stated that the administration had received indication from the Chinese leadership about reconciliation with Chinese students. He stated that such a move was a constructive step. No such constructive step took place.

The Bush administration’s muted response was echoed by its Asian allies. On July 6, Secretary Baker had met the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and urged them not to impose any more sanctions against China. The US also conveyed to Japan its hope that Japan would not isolate China. Japan’s response to the incident had been muted and continued to be taciturn.

Meanwhile the Bush Administration had also stated its intent to conduct sympathetic reviews of requests by Chinese students in the US to extend their stay. The offer at the time of announcement was only for the short duration of a one year extension. A group of more than 100 student leaders, dissident writers, intellectuals and independent trade unionists had escaped to Hong Kong following the crackdown. France, alone among the Western democracies, speedily accommodated the asylum requests of about 70 of them. The remainder, fearing detention and possible repatriation, hid from Hong Kong authorities.

Not content with the Bush Administration's lackadaisical response, Congress responded almost immediately to the crackdown. Within days, dozens of bills had been introduced by both Republicans and Democrats to strengthen sanctions against China. On June 20th, the House Banking Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance held a hearing to discuss the US position on loans to China in the multilateral development banks. The Administration refused to send a witness to the hearing. This despite the fact that US representatives to multilateral development banks are required to vote against loans to governments engaged in a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Faced with the near certainty of Congressional action to force the US to oppose loans to China, the Administration announced later that day that it would seek to postpone new multilateral development bank loans to China and directed American representatives at various international financial institutions to postpone new loans for China. As a result, the World Bank suspended lending to China for 7 months. The US State Department put Chinese loan applications for the Export Import Bank (a US banking service providing loans to US businesses seeking to invest outside the US) on hold for two weeks after the imposition of President Bush’s sanctions. Two weeks later, the loan application processing began once again.

The Administration offered humanitarian and medical assistance through the Red Cross to those injured during the assault, and stated that it would review other aspects of the Sino-US bilateral relationship.

Also on June 20th, the Administration suspended participation in all high-level exchanges of Government officials with China. But defying the very sanctions they had announced, the Bush Administration sent Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, on a secret trip to the PRC to meet with Deng Xiaoping in order to keep the lines of communication open, between the two nations. Representing the President, Eagleburger and Scowcroft conveyed to the Chinese Premier, Bush’s desire to manage short term events in a way that would best ensure a healthy relationship over time. Bush told Deng Xiaoping through Eagleburger and Scrowcroft that, in his opinion Tiananmen was China’s ‘internal affair’. The President also said he was willing to work with the Chinese toward maintaining current relations, but further arrests and detentions would lead to more public and Congressional pressures, and the President would not be able to halt further sanctions by the US.[3]

At the meeting Deng informed Scrowcroft that China would continue to punish the instigators of the rebellion and it’s behind the scene leaders in accordance with Chinese laws. He was firm in his belief that China would not waver in its resolution and if it did, the PRC would cease to exist.[4]

Again, despite the alleged ban on meetings between Chinese and US officials, Secretary Baker openly met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in July during an international conference on Cambodia.

But in response, the Chinese did agree to lift Martial law, gave verbal assurances on missile sales to other nations and released a small number of detainees. The PRC’s response to US military sanctions though, was measured. Almost three weeks after the military sanctions were announced, on June 26th, China protested the sanctions and in response, cancelled the pending visits of US military heads. In addition, China stated it’s intent to cancel all exchanges of military personnel with the US and to boycott all US invitations for the same.

While the Chinese did not adopt a confrontational attitude towards the US, they did insist that the US adopt a more long term view of its military relations with China.[5]

The Face Off: Necessity of Actions And Inaction In The Aftermath
The US began the thawing of its relations with China in 1972. It saw China as leverage against the Russians during the height of the Cold War. Building relations with Communist China initiated the beginning of the end of the Cold War. By 1988, the US and China had become major trading partners, each contributing over 10 percent to the other's total trade figures. Major US corporations such as IBM, Boeing and Chrysler along with hundreds of smaller firms had made major investment commitments to China. The range of products sourced in China steadily grew as US investors saw significant opportunities in China.

But this trend wavered dangerously after Tiananmen Square. Images of demonstrations and the crackdown dominated international media attention for several weeks, and colored the Sino-US relationship. Not only because of the dramatic nature of the events themselves, but because of what these events revealed about the nature of the Chinese regime. The horrors of the crackdown inscribed in the minds of US citizens the abuse of everything they stood for: democracy, capitalism and freedom. A sensitized US public and Congress demanded attention to human rights concerns in the Sino-US relationship.

The events of June 3rd and 4th forced a reconsideration of the dangers of engagement with a regime, ruthless enough to slaughter its own citizens for peaceful expression of views. No easy answer to this question was forthcoming, but it opened up a debate on the subject of trade relations as an avenue for political change. Under the remaining years of the Bush Administration, Congress tried to impose human rights conditions on continued Most Favored Nation for China twice, only to meet President Bush's veto. [6]

Why, in the face of continued Congressional disapproval, did the Bush Administration refuse to link US relations with China to human rights conditions? The administration offered the rationale that more could be done to make progress on these questions if commercial engagement persisted at full speed. Bush, an old China hand, believed the US was more likely to have a positive influence on China by engaging it rather than isolating it.

The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government believed the steps taken in the lead up to the crackdown were "highly necessary to the stability and development of China." In the early days of the protests by students, the government viewed the protests as an irritant but not a major threat. But as the numbers swelled to include China’s workers, intelligentsia and other citizens, martial law and a violent crackdown were seen to be the only methodology to crush a movement, the CCP perceived as a threat to stability, reforms and growth.

While Deng’s reforms were aimed toward economic growth, the average Chinese were highly dissatisfied with their impact. Inflation seemed out of control and there was a widening income gap and profiteering by CCP officials and members of their families. Capitalism had spurred economic growth in China in the 1980’s but it had also dramatically increased social inequality.

The imposition of sanctions by countries such as Japan and the EU, and especially the US were perceived by the Chinese leadership as interference. The CCP leadership often emphasized that the basic trend of the post Cold War period was one of “multi-polarization” and that the United States was the only superpower. Chinese analysts described this combination as a system composed of one super-power and many strong powers. The dominant superpower (US) was perceived in China to be threatening in at least two ways: first, in its perceived intention and, second, in its military capability. In Chinese eyes, the United States was plotting a conspiracy of ‘peaceful evolution,’ a conspiracy to topple communist governments by nonmilitary means. [7]
At the end of the Cold war, two issues loomed large in the relationship between the US and China: human rights and Taiwan. As already noted, the Bush administration was reluctant to apply strong sanctions against China after Tiananmen, which caused domestic controversy. For several years after Tiananmen, controversies over the awarding of most-favored nation status to China became an annual ritual in the U.S. Congress.

References
[1] http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/episodes/23/script.html
[2] Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, Kerry Dumbaugh,
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
[3] State Department document entitled "Themes" (June 29, 1989)
[4] World Transformed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pg 107
[5] Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No. 65, June 27, 1700 Local (June 27, 1989)
[6] US-China
Relations, 1989 - 1999: Ten Years of Constructive Engagement? Bama Athreya May 26, 1999

[7] Age of Uncertainty, The US China Japan triangle from Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2005), Erza F Vogel, Yuan Ming, Akihiko Tanaka, Harward University Asia Centre, 2002

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005

1989 April-July Tiananmen Square:The Legacy And Repercussions For U.S-China Relations

The Issues: From The Perspective Of The Great Wall And The White House

How did the situation reach such a flash point? Why were students demonstrating at Tiananmen Square? What forced the Communist Government to crackdown in such a harsh manner? Who authorized the PLA, viewed by the Chinese as protectors as against their view of the Police as aggressors, to attack citizens? How did the world perceive the protests and the subsequent deaths? And what was the reaction of the US to such blatant human rights abuse?

China had been attempting for two decades to reach out to the world despite the Iron Curtain. In the mid-1980s, Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping tried to accelerate the pace of political reform within the country. He set three goals: (1) to maintain the vitality of the party and the state; (2) to overcome bureaucratism and raise efficiency; and (3) to increase the enthusiasm of basic-level workers, peasants, and intellectuals. But Deng realized that political reform in China was too difficult. He said, “The country is so large and things are so complicated, it is not easy to reform. Therefore in determining policies we must be cautious, and resolve issues only when we are likely to succeed.”[1]

The pro-democracy student movement began on April 15, 1989 with the death of Hu Yaobang. Yaobang had been the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and an advocate of economic and political reform. He resigned his post in 1987, after Chinese conservatives forced him to accept the responsibility for student demonstrations that took place in 1986.[2]

A Nobel Peace Prize nominee, he was seen as the only CCP member capable of bringing about political reform. On his demise, students felt they had lost their only hope for change. The day after his death, several hundred students marched to Tiananmen to place wreaths at the Revolutionary Hero’s Monument and their numbers continued to swell. By April 22nd, Hu’s memorial service saw 100,000 mourners gather, among them students who conducted a ceremonial Confucian remonstrance. At the end of the ritual remonstrance, they asked to present a petition that spoke of political reform to the CCP leadership, who declined to receive the same. This refusal sparked off a hunger strike by 3,000 students at Tiananmen Square. The strike succeeded in mobilizing the general population and challenged the legitimacy of the CCP leadership. The official Government controlled media termed the hunger strike as, ‘turmoil’ and ‘unpatriotic’.[3] Outside Tiananmen, 150,000 students supported by more than 350,000 Beijing citizens marched through police lines established during the hunger strike, to protest the CCP’s snubbing of the issue. Similar demonstrations were conducted elsewhere in China.

The Sino-Soviet talks in May brought with it, not just Gorbachev and his delegation but also international media scrutiny. The PRC regime as a result, agreed to meet the students in dialogue, though with no results. It later declared martial law in Beijing, inciting Beijing’s residents to come out in strength against what they viewed as a potential attack on students. Just a few days after students erected the “Goddess of Democracy” in the Square, the PRC regime issued orders to crackdown on the demonstrations. The order issued by Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council on May 20th stated, “In view of the serious turmoil in Beijing Municipality, the state council has decided to enforce martial law, so as to check the turmoil with a firm hand.”[4] On May 24th PRC Executive Vice Chairman Yang Sangkun said to the Chinese Central Military Commission, “Although martial law has been declared, some of the martial law tasks have in fact not been carried out. We can no longer retreat and must launch an offensive. If any troops do not obey orders, I will punish those responsible according to the Military Law.[5] On June 6th, State Council Spokesman Yaun Mu appeared on Chinese National Television and called the demonstrations shocking counter revolutionary rebellion. He went on to say, “We have achieved the initial, or shall we say the first step victory in crushing the rebellion. The rebellion however has not been completely quelled however. I wish to make it clear that we should not have mercy for those who planned the riots and those behind the scenes organizers of the riots, because the contradictions between them and us are of an antagonistic nature.”[6]

But there were factions within the CCP which were against the imposition of martial law and a violent crackdown against the students. Chief among them was the then CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. For his defiance, Ziyang was stripped of his position and replaced by the First Party Secretary of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin[7] (Became President of the PRC between 1993-2003). Ziyang remained under house arrest until his death in 2004.

This was a government losing legitimacy, with its cadres viewing the leadership’s inability to accept people’s discontent as its inhumanity. A regime that was habituated to internal revolt and rebellion, the Chinese government was exceedingly sensitive at this time to civil protest. While in the west, a certain level of disagreement and protest would be considered as a part of a working democracy and the result of diverse needs of various strata of society, the very fact that the Government of PRC was based on internal unrest, suggested that in it’s reaction to the pro-democracy demonstrations, civil unrest in Communist China was viewed as the gravest of threats to the regime, it’s legitimacy and stability. The elders in the CCP knew how fragile their hold on power was. The old revolutionaries themselves once had been a tiny handful of conspirators plotting against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Against all odds, they had won the cultural revolution. This explains their reaction to the reports that China was in the grip of a vast, popular uprising. What they cared about was their own hold on power; what they feared was their people.[8]

But through all of the turmoil of the months of April and May 1989 the US Government kept a neutral stance on the build up of internal tensions in China. To the fury of human rights activists, The Bush Administration avoided making human rights in China, an agenda of Sino-US talks. According to Human Rights Watch, avoiding offense appeared to have become the Bush Administration's guiding principle.

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, studiously avoided comment on the growing democracy movement, and at no time did they publicly suggest that there would be serious repercussions if the Chinese authorities responded violently. But lower in the US Government echelons, at a May 4th hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Richard Williams, stated that the US government hoped that the Chinese authorities would act with restraint. Ambassador Williams though did not elaborate on the potential US reaction to a crackdown on student demonstrators, but said, "We are for absolute freedom of expression and press, and so forth, but I do not believe that we advocate any country taking steps if such steps would result in social chaos, and thus be incapable of reaching the goals which we want." [9]

The Administration refrained from public comment when martial law was declared on May 20. According to reports by Human Rights Watch, Administration sources did indicate that President Bush sent private messages to Deng Xiaoping, urging him not to use force against the students, but it was unclear with what strength those messages were conveyed.[10] But in what would prove to be a major thorn in the Sino-US relations during and post Tiananmen Square, democracy activist Professor Fang Lizhi was given protection from Chinese authorities in the aftermath of June 3rd and 4th in the Beijing US embassy. This was a source of extreme irritation to the Chinese authorities which the Bush Administration attempted to minimize by not acknowledging Fang’s presence in the succeeding months and even when he was nominated for peace awards.

Towards the end of June, Chinese party elders had regained control and were highly visible as thousands were detained and executions of student leaders began. Intelligence reports suggested that rivalries within the Chinese politburo were increasing. The economy was on a rapid decline, with inflation out of control and analysts were predicting a large foreign exchange deficit in the months after Tiananmen. Foreign investments were drying up and an economic stagnation was seen by most as inevitable.[11]

References:
[1] Age of Uncertainty, The US China Japan triangle from Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2005), Erza F Vogel, Yuan Ming, Akihiko Tanaka, Harward university Asia Centre, 2002
[2] www.cbsnews.com
[3]Mobilization in the 1989 Student Movement: A Signaling Game, University of Michigan, Danie Stockmann
[4] Beijing Spring, pp. 315-316
[5] "Main Points of Yang Shangkun’s Speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission," Ming Pao (Enlightenment) (Hong Kong), May 29, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 320-327
[6] Beijing Television Service, June 6, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 363-376.
[7] http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/heroes/zhao.html
[8] Revolution's Dark Legacy, Asiaweek, Jonathan Mirsky, January 19, 2001
[9] Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/, Press Releases
[10] Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/, Press Releases
[11] State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Status Report on Situation in China as of July 26, 1989"

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005

1989 April-July Tiananmen Square: The Legacy And Repercussions For U.S-China Relations

The Chronology: Tiananmen Square Crackdown
On the evening of June 3rd 1989, three thousand students readied themselves for a test that no university could give them, a test of their resolve to change China forever. As they huddled together, unarmed; the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) bore down on them armed with tanks, automatic weapons and Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). The 27th Army assigned to the crackdown left behind, a trail of the blood on the roads and alleys leading up to the symbol of the Communist Party’s strength Tiananmen Square. But contrary to popular perception, the blood that flowed on the night of June 3rd was mostly of Beijing’s citizens and supporters of the student movement and not just the students themselves.[1]

The confrontation continued through the night and into the early morning hours of the 4th. It was an unfair battle, with a highly trained and well equipped army facing down the unarmed citizens it was sworn to protect. Citizens fought for seven hours against troops to keep them from attacking students who remained in the Square. Seven hours in which the US intelligence Service estimated initially, up to 500 dead and thousands injured.

Initially, teargas and truncheons were the PLA’s weapons of choice, but these were just a preliminary warning. Shooting began shortly thereafter. Protesters did not seem fazed by the violence and stood their ground, swarming around tanks and APCs and attacking the PLA with Molotov cocktails, bottles and rocks.

As the troops won their inequitable battle and entered Tiananmen Square, protesting students had already started to leave their positions and disperse. The PLA opened fire indiscriminately on the student demonstrators who remained. The 27th Army suffered its share of losses as well. APCs were set on fire by protesters and soldiers trying to escape the flames were beaten to death. As the sun rose on the morning of June 4th, no one had an answer to the question as to who authorized the streets of Beijing to be stained with its citizens’ blood? [2]

The battle meanwhile, waged mainly on the approach roads to the square, where students and Beijing’s citizens attempted to slow down the PLA advance with bricks and stones. Most of the students in the square had left in groups, heading east. Those left behind were beaten, shot or run over by PLA tanks. Students attempting to talk to the PLA were shot on approach and there were pitched battles between Beijing citizens and the PLA at major intersections around the city.[3]

As the day wore on, reports from foreign media, consular staff of various countries and international students flowed into the international news. Troops fired indiscriminately into crowds; students, foreign reporters and workers were beaten and hospitals started to overflow with the dead and injured. But in the worst of the atrocities, were confirmed reports of students being shot in the back as they fled the advancing columns of the PLA.[4]

The Tiananmen Square incident did not just contain itself to those two days in June. The crackdown continued with the Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) issuing warnings of executions of students and arrests of student leaders. Clashes with civilians in and around Beijing continued even as non-violent protests took place in other Chinese cities.

The Chinese Red Cross estimated 2,600 military and civilian deaths with 7,000 injured, but these figures did not include deaths on the streets of the city. Their tally was a compilation of data from Beijing Hospitals. Official casualty statistics differed markedly from these and were contradictory to an extent. While one official version put the number of deaths, both military and civilian, at 300 on June 7th, another reported 5,000 injured troops and 3,000 civilian injuries. But an official press release on June 14th claimed 100 military deaths and thousands of injuries along with 100 civilian deaths and 1,000 civilian injuries.

References:
[1] Cable, From: Department of State, Wash DC, To: U.S. Embassy Beijing, and All Diplomatic and Consular Posts, TFCHO1: SITREP 1, 1700 EDT (June 3, 1989) ;US National Security Archive
[2] US Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 4, 1989, China: Troops Open Fire; US National Security Archive
[3] Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, What Happened on the Night of June 3/4? (June 22, 1989)
[4] Secretary of State's Morning Summary for June 5, 1989, China: After the Bloodbath

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005

I'm currently researching the Tiananmen Square Crackdown of 1989 and am discovering facts that are otherwise blown out of proportion. In a 20 part analysis of the incident I'm going to attempt to reconstruct the event itself, this time with sources from the CCP, US Intelligence, Dissidents, Students, Embassy Officials and most importantly the CCP's secret documents and the De-classified US National Security documents. Then I will analyse why what and how the scenario played out. But in analysing the foreign policy of the US and China in 1989, I'm going to restrict myself to the months of April, May, June (when the event actually took place) and July. This time bound analysis will allow me to dig deeper into the meaning of each decision taken and delve into the personalities that allowed the events to take place. I'm a deep believer in Actor Specific Foreign Policy Analysis and that is going to be my ultimate backbone to the findings I plan to share.

It's Mahatma Gandhi's birth anniversary today...wonder if his birth date will bring any good news to anyone? Maybe today will be the day that George Bush decides to manage his own country and leave the rest of the world alone! Maybe today will be the day that Genocidal tribesmen will say - Enough! Maybe today will be the day that we all decide to ban guns! Maybe today will be the day to say.. maybe those people (Martin Luther King, Mahatma Gandhi etc) had something afterall...maybe today will be the day the world will say - Non violence is the answer afterall!

The Leviathan, The hegemonic power that has been the beacon of what liberty, equality and justice has stood for in the world at the brink of a nuclear war – The Cuban Missile Crisis! Today I watched a documentary style movie called ‘The Missiles of October’ starring a cast mostly unknown to me and of course, a very young Martin Sheen in yet another West Wing role – though this time NOT the president!! And West Wing it wasn’t. Terrible acting (even by Martin Sheen – Awful impersonation of Robert Kennedy!) and even worse direction and editing!

But at the core of the movie was the truth. The script was based on the transcripts of recordings of JF Kennedy and his team’s deliberations during the days that led up to the Cuban Missile crisis and gave an interesting insight into the dynamics of decision making at the highest levels. It was an insight into how group think can be manipulated in a team of people whose belief systems are separate and seem to have no common ground. It also gave an insight into the tremendous pressures of High Office and the way situations must be handled taking into consideration the consequences of even the most minor of actions in terms of not just physical consequences but that of the perceptions of the rest of the world and how actions can bereft oneself of the idealogical position of being a power that the rest of the world looks up to. From the moment JFK found out about the missiles, rattled off the names of his 14 advisors to be called for a meeting, to the pressures he faced from members of the ExComm to launch an all out offensive and making them come to a unanimous agreement on the course of action to be taken, the telefilm was definitely a gripping account of the first few days of the crisis. The way he handled building up the case in various campaigns around the US as his team fought out the next course of action in a closed room, to the mistakes he made in his dealings with the Russians – I could not but compare his situation to that of George Bush today and the magnitude of difference in the way both Presidents handled their relations with the American public and rest of the world.

Once the missiles were discovered, Kennedy wanted more proof that they were indeed not for defence purposes, before taking any further steps. That they were nuclear weapons and the enemy was a force as powerful as his, made his situation all the more precarious. The methodology of arriving at a unanimous decision was Robert Kennedy’s brain child. (He reminded me off Colin Powell, stuck among the rest of the Bush Adminstration – The sole voice of reason among wolves baying for blood!) While JFK’s decision to withhold information from the Russian Ambassador in hind sight was an error of enormous magnitude – seen from his viewpoint, it might have been the only way to preempt any Russian action.

Again, drawing parallels with the Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq, the way the issue of Weapons of Mass Destruction were handled and the way JFK handled the security threat of Russian Nuclear Weapons shows the concern of realists of the 1960’s with regard to world opinion and the maintainance of their image as the propagators of the concepts of liberty and freedom.

There is no question that in the age of the Cold War, JFK was a realist and so was Krushchev. But the way the game played out between the two was like an illegal drag race – the question was: who’d blink first?

We all know how the Cuban Missile Crisis ended, but I am curious to see how the game played out, in the minds of the actors involved. As I’m slowly learning – it is actor specific behaviour that determines the behaviour of the group. The leader with the influence to shape destiny can determine where destiny goes. As off now, the JFK team just wants to be the aggressor, to bomb a tiny nation 90 miles off the coast of Florida! But reasonable voices like that of Robert Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara are the conscience of the team, reminding them at every step that, the world is watching! And thankfully as we all know, John F Kennedy was listening!

Team cohesion and responsible action is the key to success. I think the core learning I’ve taken away tonight is the concept of group think. Just as JFK built consensus to have a strong ExComm behind him as he took action against the Russians, in any work place, a team that thinks as one (not just voices one opinion) is the strongest and most likely to succeed. In a consulting environment I believe team work will be the most important factor as will be the ability to step up and take responsible action.

Neo-Realism is “dead”!The criticisms that the concept had to face atleast the overarching one seemed to be it’s hang-up on “security”!

“The indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy the world” – McNamara during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
“Is it fair that the switch is in one man’s hands?” – McNamara discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis in the 1980s.

At last count, the official version by Fidel Castro put the number of nuclear weapons on Cuban Soil at 162 during the missile crisis. That was far more than what the JFK Administration had ever calculated. As we continued watching ‘The Missiles of October’ I was taken aback at the sudden one-ness of the team in it’s thinking. Suddenly everyone agreed that a blockade was the best option. Legalities were taken care off. The acquisance of Charles De Gaulle was sought – the acceptance of US Allies to the agreed course of action was important according to JFK. (Again, I see the differences between George Bush and JFK), and even as the blockade was planned and set in motion – the US chose to uphold international law and faced off with the USSR in the UN Security Council.

What piqued my interest was the military and navy’s reactions – where it was obvious that they didn’t take the chain of command seriously and had serious differences with the administration’s views and McNamara’s control over them. Was it JFK’s relative youth? Or was it the ambiguity surrounding a civilian making military decisions? But as someone later pointed out – The US armed forces have a drastically different stance today. They are more cautious about going to war than even civilian administrations.

But it wasn’t suprising at all to see Congressmen and Senators agreeing to give JFK’s plan to go ahead with the blockade, but in the same breath saying, “it’s all on your head!” Truly, a self preserving politician’s inherent reaction! It is almost nerve racking that McNamara’s words were so phrophetic! If JFK had given in to the pressures he faced within his team, Congress and the armed forces, “bombed” Cuba and conducted an invasion, ala Bush and Iraq, the world as we know it would no longer exist. USSR would have an open invitation for aggression in Berlin and other European areas and could have launched a nuclear offensive from the USSR itself. And if the blockade had failed, the Realist camp on both sides would have then ensured that the world would have ceased to exist. What irony and a tremendous consequence to have on one’s conscience! Human fallibility is an underestimated weakness that can bring the world to it’s knees. But as I understand it, it is specific actors that can preserve or destroy us as a result of that fallibility.

Kruschev and his portrayal have been one-sided till date. We only know what the west allows us to know of his thought process, his rule and his ideology. This movie was no different, with assumptions being made on Kruschev’s behalf on what he was thinking even as he placed the nuclear weapons in Cuba, American discovery of those weapons and the subsequent negotiations thereafter. But one thing is clear – Underestimation of and lack of understanding actor specific actions elongated and extended the crisis, almost bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. Actor specific information could have stopped the Russians from assuming they would get away with placing nuclear weapons in Cuba and would’ve allowed the Americans to be more direct in their negotiations to get those weapons removed from Cuba.

But here, let us not forget that Kruschev did blink first. But alas, JFK didn’t see it quick enough, putting his reaction off till the next morning. A gut reaction could have ended the whole thing. Instead he chose to rest, by which time, Kruschev was facing the Presidium and a new letter of conditions had already been drafted and sent, worsening the crisis.
But as I keep pointing out, along with McNamara, I’m absolutely struck by Robert Kennedy’s reactions through the crisis. His statements like, “you're going to kill an awful lot of people [with an air strike] and we are going to take a lot of heat for it.... You're going to announce the reason that you're doing it is because they're sending this kind of missiles, well, I think it's almost incumbent upon the Russians then to say, Well, we're going to send them in again, and if you do it again ... we're going to do the same thing to Turkey or Iran.” (I took down some of the dialogues. They aren’t direct transcriptions but, close to the words he uttered). His despondency is striking when he adds on the statement, "Now I know what Tojo must have felt like when he was planning Pearl Harbor." Attacking a much smaller country was not something the United States did. But it does it now since somehow, Democratization and the Axis of Evil has become far more of an issue than all out nuclear war.
Lessons learnt? Study your opponent or client as well as you study the system in which your opponent or client works in and when an olive branch or offer is extended, that actor specific study will help you know immediately whether it is an illusion or reality.

But one of the more haunting scenes that made a mark on me was the difference with which the US handled the Cuban Missile Crisis in the UN Security council in 1962, than it did Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction in 2002. As I have referred to this situation before – the US had undeniable proof of the nuclear weapons when it went to the Security Council. It was able to win the support of all other countries on the basis of that evidence and was also able to put USSR on the spot. None of which happened in 2002, as the US blustered it’s way through the “evidence” of the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq.

Evidence is crucial to presenting a case in any situation and as a consultant pointing out weaknesses in a system that might be in desperate need for repair, I know I will have to walk a thin line to prevent any backlash as also, present concrete evidence to warrant any change that I’d want to bring to the table.
But discounting all the bad acting and bad accents, maybe George Bush should be given a tape of The Missles of October – History was always a good teacher!

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005

‘The Spy Who Came In From The Cold’ is the introduction to the concepts of realism, idealism and consequently the reality of life! It's a movie made in the mid-60's that I watched and walked away feeling unsatisfied with the answers it was trying to give the world.

I’m a big war movie buff and while the acting, the cinematography or the editing might not have exactly been equivalent to the 1950’s/60’s movie classics like ‘Guns of Navarone’ or ‘Tora Tora Tora’, (I bet this movie didn’t even make it to the nomination lists of any award!) it did raise moral questions on what is right, what is moral and who really does win in the end – Is it that Idealist, waving the flags of peace, joining movements, believing in Utopia and the inherent goodness of man? Or the Idealist who believes that every action is for the greater good of the people? Or is it the Realist who thinks that it is perfectly acceptable to adopt the practices of those whom he is fighting to win the war and not just the battle?

The movie struck a chord in me to the point of asking myself, that, if I had to see people die everyday for a cause I believed strongly in, a cause that might be as important as preserving the security of my nation – would I be able to sustain having the blood of human beings, whether they be friend or foe, on my hands, on my conscience? I don’t know! It is a thought that has never struck me, and I believe is a concept for which I will have to do a lot of soul searching to get an answer.

So – who really does win in the end? That’s such a simplistic question! Does anyone? In a divided world, who is the winner and who is the loser? Are people even thinking in a ticking bomb situation whether they are idealists or realists? Even if they aren’t and observers are, in whatever I’ve been able to convince myself off in the past few hours, No one wins! Not the idealists who unfortunately in this case died, not the realists who in this case lived and not the cynic who in this case died as well! In a situation of such severity, the cheating, the games, the duplicity all eventually led to some people dying, some people living and others going about their lives as if the entire event never happened. And that to me is real – that the battle rages only where it is viewed as a battle between realists and idealists! In the real world – life goes on no matter who wins! Because the real world, outside the realm of realism and idealism is where Practialism (just a word I’ve made up - I do hope I can learn the theoretical word for this – sounds exceedingly uninformed when I use it), i.e. the concept of interdependency and practical decision making without the influence of realism and idealism, takes root! ‘The Spy Who Came In From The Cold’ is a great way to capture the tensions and difficult decisions that had to be made in the post WW2 era – The Cold War era! But to simplify the movie into a, who won, with what ideology, is to simplify life, and that to me is impossibility! Nothing in life is ever that simple!

The Spy Who Came In From The Cold made me think whether I was a realist or an idealist in my approach to International Affairs. Could I, for my country or my cause allow my soul to be abused? I think I am neither a realist or an idealist! In my reflections on the movie and the lessons I can take away from it to use in my career, I believe I walk a different path than the characters of this film. It is a path that sees the world as one, and each person’s ideology as part of an interconnected world (Whether they be extremists or moderates). Would I ever place myself in a position where my view of the world would determine the lives of others? I think not. Would I allow my work to mould me into a person that believes in such thinking? I know not! If I ever have to be in a position where my actions will determine the future of others, each of those actions will be thought out to determine the best possible solution for each person concerned, no matter how difficult the process.

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005