1989 April-July Tiananmen Square:The Legacy And Repercussions For U.S-China Relations

The Actions: Sanctions and Counter Sanctions
As news of the CCP’s brutal crushing of the pro-democracy demonstrators flowed in through the US Beijing Embassy, Intelligence and Media reports, the US Government did not rush to make a judgment. With a wait and watch approach, US Secretary of State James Baker, appeared on Cable News Network (CNN) and refused to hypothesize on the Administration’s potential reaction or on the consideration of sanctions. He said, “It would appear that there may be some violence being used here on both sides. Before we get into hypothetical situations, let's see how this most recent and extremely deplorable development unfolds. Let's see what happens over the course of the next few days before we start hypothesizing about what we might or might not do in the future."[1]

On June 5, 1989, a day after the main crackdown, President George Bush initiated the first US sanctions on China. First on the agenda was the suspension of all government-to-government military sales and commercial exports of weapons to China. The US sanctions entailed the embargo of ammunition and technical equipment and technology such as helicopters and spare parts to the Chinese. The sanction was stringent to the extent that it barred the sale of satellites from the US to China. The sanction also included nuclear material, facilities or components, goods or technology which could be used for nuclear explosive purposes or could help China build Atomic Energy projects. The sanction included the suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese military Leaders.[2]

But on July 9, the Administration announced its decision to sell three Boeing jets to China, valued at $150 million. (A fourth aircraft was delivered in August.) The delivery had been halted, along with all other military sales, in June. The items were considered dual-use because their navigational equipment could be used for military purposes. The change in policy was justified by White House Chief of Staff John Sununu who stated that the administration had received indication from the Chinese leadership about reconciliation with Chinese students. He stated that such a move was a constructive step. No such constructive step took place.

The Bush administration’s muted response was echoed by its Asian allies. On July 6, Secretary Baker had met the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and urged them not to impose any more sanctions against China. The US also conveyed to Japan its hope that Japan would not isolate China. Japan’s response to the incident had been muted and continued to be taciturn.

Meanwhile the Bush Administration had also stated its intent to conduct sympathetic reviews of requests by Chinese students in the US to extend their stay. The offer at the time of announcement was only for the short duration of a one year extension. A group of more than 100 student leaders, dissident writers, intellectuals and independent trade unionists had escaped to Hong Kong following the crackdown. France, alone among the Western democracies, speedily accommodated the asylum requests of about 70 of them. The remainder, fearing detention and possible repatriation, hid from Hong Kong authorities.

Not content with the Bush Administration's lackadaisical response, Congress responded almost immediately to the crackdown. Within days, dozens of bills had been introduced by both Republicans and Democrats to strengthen sanctions against China. On June 20th, the House Banking Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance held a hearing to discuss the US position on loans to China in the multilateral development banks. The Administration refused to send a witness to the hearing. This despite the fact that US representatives to multilateral development banks are required to vote against loans to governments engaged in a pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. Faced with the near certainty of Congressional action to force the US to oppose loans to China, the Administration announced later that day that it would seek to postpone new multilateral development bank loans to China and directed American representatives at various international financial institutions to postpone new loans for China. As a result, the World Bank suspended lending to China for 7 months. The US State Department put Chinese loan applications for the Export Import Bank (a US banking service providing loans to US businesses seeking to invest outside the US) on hold for two weeks after the imposition of President Bush’s sanctions. Two weeks later, the loan application processing began once again.

The Administration offered humanitarian and medical assistance through the Red Cross to those injured during the assault, and stated that it would review other aspects of the Sino-US bilateral relationship.

Also on June 20th, the Administration suspended participation in all high-level exchanges of Government officials with China. But defying the very sanctions they had announced, the Bush Administration sent Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, on a secret trip to the PRC to meet with Deng Xiaoping in order to keep the lines of communication open, between the two nations. Representing the President, Eagleburger and Scowcroft conveyed to the Chinese Premier, Bush’s desire to manage short term events in a way that would best ensure a healthy relationship over time. Bush told Deng Xiaoping through Eagleburger and Scrowcroft that, in his opinion Tiananmen was China’s ‘internal affair’. The President also said he was willing to work with the Chinese toward maintaining current relations, but further arrests and detentions would lead to more public and Congressional pressures, and the President would not be able to halt further sanctions by the US.[3]

At the meeting Deng informed Scrowcroft that China would continue to punish the instigators of the rebellion and it’s behind the scene leaders in accordance with Chinese laws. He was firm in his belief that China would not waver in its resolution and if it did, the PRC would cease to exist.[4]

Again, despite the alleged ban on meetings between Chinese and US officials, Secretary Baker openly met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in July during an international conference on Cambodia.

But in response, the Chinese did agree to lift Martial law, gave verbal assurances on missile sales to other nations and released a small number of detainees. The PRC’s response to US military sanctions though, was measured. Almost three weeks after the military sanctions were announced, on June 26th, China protested the sanctions and in response, cancelled the pending visits of US military heads. In addition, China stated it’s intent to cancel all exchanges of military personnel with the US and to boycott all US invitations for the same.

While the Chinese did not adopt a confrontational attitude towards the US, they did insist that the US adopt a more long term view of its military relations with China.[5]

The Face Off: Necessity of Actions And Inaction In The Aftermath
The US began the thawing of its relations with China in 1972. It saw China as leverage against the Russians during the height of the Cold War. Building relations with Communist China initiated the beginning of the end of the Cold War. By 1988, the US and China had become major trading partners, each contributing over 10 percent to the other's total trade figures. Major US corporations such as IBM, Boeing and Chrysler along with hundreds of smaller firms had made major investment commitments to China. The range of products sourced in China steadily grew as US investors saw significant opportunities in China.

But this trend wavered dangerously after Tiananmen Square. Images of demonstrations and the crackdown dominated international media attention for several weeks, and colored the Sino-US relationship. Not only because of the dramatic nature of the events themselves, but because of what these events revealed about the nature of the Chinese regime. The horrors of the crackdown inscribed in the minds of US citizens the abuse of everything they stood for: democracy, capitalism and freedom. A sensitized US public and Congress demanded attention to human rights concerns in the Sino-US relationship.

The events of June 3rd and 4th forced a reconsideration of the dangers of engagement with a regime, ruthless enough to slaughter its own citizens for peaceful expression of views. No easy answer to this question was forthcoming, but it opened up a debate on the subject of trade relations as an avenue for political change. Under the remaining years of the Bush Administration, Congress tried to impose human rights conditions on continued Most Favored Nation for China twice, only to meet President Bush's veto. [6]

Why, in the face of continued Congressional disapproval, did the Bush Administration refuse to link US relations with China to human rights conditions? The administration offered the rationale that more could be done to make progress on these questions if commercial engagement persisted at full speed. Bush, an old China hand, believed the US was more likely to have a positive influence on China by engaging it rather than isolating it.

The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government believed the steps taken in the lead up to the crackdown were "highly necessary to the stability and development of China." In the early days of the protests by students, the government viewed the protests as an irritant but not a major threat. But as the numbers swelled to include China’s workers, intelligentsia and other citizens, martial law and a violent crackdown were seen to be the only methodology to crush a movement, the CCP perceived as a threat to stability, reforms and growth.

While Deng’s reforms were aimed toward economic growth, the average Chinese were highly dissatisfied with their impact. Inflation seemed out of control and there was a widening income gap and profiteering by CCP officials and members of their families. Capitalism had spurred economic growth in China in the 1980’s but it had also dramatically increased social inequality.

The imposition of sanctions by countries such as Japan and the EU, and especially the US were perceived by the Chinese leadership as interference. The CCP leadership often emphasized that the basic trend of the post Cold War period was one of “multi-polarization” and that the United States was the only superpower. Chinese analysts described this combination as a system composed of one super-power and many strong powers. The dominant superpower (US) was perceived in China to be threatening in at least two ways: first, in its perceived intention and, second, in its military capability. In Chinese eyes, the United States was plotting a conspiracy of ‘peaceful evolution,’ a conspiracy to topple communist governments by nonmilitary means. [7]
At the end of the Cold war, two issues loomed large in the relationship between the US and China: human rights and Taiwan. As already noted, the Bush administration was reluctant to apply strong sanctions against China after Tiananmen, which caused domestic controversy. For several years after Tiananmen, controversies over the awarding of most-favored nation status to China became an annual ritual in the U.S. Congress.

References
[1] http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/episodes/23/script.html
[2] Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, Kerry Dumbaugh,
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
[3] State Department document entitled "Themes" (June 29, 1989)
[4] World Transformed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pg 107
[5] Cable, From: U.S. Embassy Beijing, To: Department of State, Wash DC, TFCH01: SITREP No. 65, June 27, 1700 Local (June 27, 1989)
[6] US-China
Relations, 1989 - 1999: Ten Years of Constructive Engagement? Bama Athreya May 26, 1999

[7] Age of Uncertainty, The US China Japan triangle from Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2005), Erza F Vogel, Yuan Ming, Akihiko Tanaka, Harward University Asia Centre, 2002

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005