1989 April-July Tiananmen Square:The Legacy And Repercussions For U.S-China Relations

The Issues: From The Perspective Of The Great Wall And The White House

How did the situation reach such a flash point? Why were students demonstrating at Tiananmen Square? What forced the Communist Government to crackdown in such a harsh manner? Who authorized the PLA, viewed by the Chinese as protectors as against their view of the Police as aggressors, to attack citizens? How did the world perceive the protests and the subsequent deaths? And what was the reaction of the US to such blatant human rights abuse?

China had been attempting for two decades to reach out to the world despite the Iron Curtain. In the mid-1980s, Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping tried to accelerate the pace of political reform within the country. He set three goals: (1) to maintain the vitality of the party and the state; (2) to overcome bureaucratism and raise efficiency; and (3) to increase the enthusiasm of basic-level workers, peasants, and intellectuals. But Deng realized that political reform in China was too difficult. He said, “The country is so large and things are so complicated, it is not easy to reform. Therefore in determining policies we must be cautious, and resolve issues only when we are likely to succeed.”[1]

The pro-democracy student movement began on April 15, 1989 with the death of Hu Yaobang. Yaobang had been the former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and an advocate of economic and political reform. He resigned his post in 1987, after Chinese conservatives forced him to accept the responsibility for student demonstrations that took place in 1986.[2]

A Nobel Peace Prize nominee, he was seen as the only CCP member capable of bringing about political reform. On his demise, students felt they had lost their only hope for change. The day after his death, several hundred students marched to Tiananmen to place wreaths at the Revolutionary Hero’s Monument and their numbers continued to swell. By April 22nd, Hu’s memorial service saw 100,000 mourners gather, among them students who conducted a ceremonial Confucian remonstrance. At the end of the ritual remonstrance, they asked to present a petition that spoke of political reform to the CCP leadership, who declined to receive the same. This refusal sparked off a hunger strike by 3,000 students at Tiananmen Square. The strike succeeded in mobilizing the general population and challenged the legitimacy of the CCP leadership. The official Government controlled media termed the hunger strike as, ‘turmoil’ and ‘unpatriotic’.[3] Outside Tiananmen, 150,000 students supported by more than 350,000 Beijing citizens marched through police lines established during the hunger strike, to protest the CCP’s snubbing of the issue. Similar demonstrations were conducted elsewhere in China.

The Sino-Soviet talks in May brought with it, not just Gorbachev and his delegation but also international media scrutiny. The PRC regime as a result, agreed to meet the students in dialogue, though with no results. It later declared martial law in Beijing, inciting Beijing’s residents to come out in strength against what they viewed as a potential attack on students. Just a few days after students erected the “Goddess of Democracy” in the Square, the PRC regime issued orders to crackdown on the demonstrations. The order issued by Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council on May 20th stated, “In view of the serious turmoil in Beijing Municipality, the state council has decided to enforce martial law, so as to check the turmoil with a firm hand.”[4] On May 24th PRC Executive Vice Chairman Yang Sangkun said to the Chinese Central Military Commission, “Although martial law has been declared, some of the martial law tasks have in fact not been carried out. We can no longer retreat and must launch an offensive. If any troops do not obey orders, I will punish those responsible according to the Military Law.[5] On June 6th, State Council Spokesman Yaun Mu appeared on Chinese National Television and called the demonstrations shocking counter revolutionary rebellion. He went on to say, “We have achieved the initial, or shall we say the first step victory in crushing the rebellion. The rebellion however has not been completely quelled however. I wish to make it clear that we should not have mercy for those who planned the riots and those behind the scenes organizers of the riots, because the contradictions between them and us are of an antagonistic nature.”[6]

But there were factions within the CCP which were against the imposition of martial law and a violent crackdown against the students. Chief among them was the then CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. For his defiance, Ziyang was stripped of his position and replaced by the First Party Secretary of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin[7] (Became President of the PRC between 1993-2003). Ziyang remained under house arrest until his death in 2004.

This was a government losing legitimacy, with its cadres viewing the leadership’s inability to accept people’s discontent as its inhumanity. A regime that was habituated to internal revolt and rebellion, the Chinese government was exceedingly sensitive at this time to civil protest. While in the west, a certain level of disagreement and protest would be considered as a part of a working democracy and the result of diverse needs of various strata of society, the very fact that the Government of PRC was based on internal unrest, suggested that in it’s reaction to the pro-democracy demonstrations, civil unrest in Communist China was viewed as the gravest of threats to the regime, it’s legitimacy and stability. The elders in the CCP knew how fragile their hold on power was. The old revolutionaries themselves once had been a tiny handful of conspirators plotting against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Against all odds, they had won the cultural revolution. This explains their reaction to the reports that China was in the grip of a vast, popular uprising. What they cared about was their own hold on power; what they feared was their people.[8]

But through all of the turmoil of the months of April and May 1989 the US Government kept a neutral stance on the build up of internal tensions in China. To the fury of human rights activists, The Bush Administration avoided making human rights in China, an agenda of Sino-US talks. According to Human Rights Watch, avoiding offense appeared to have become the Bush Administration's guiding principle.

President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, studiously avoided comment on the growing democracy movement, and at no time did they publicly suggest that there would be serious repercussions if the Chinese authorities responded violently. But lower in the US Government echelons, at a May 4th hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Richard Williams, stated that the US government hoped that the Chinese authorities would act with restraint. Ambassador Williams though did not elaborate on the potential US reaction to a crackdown on student demonstrators, but said, "We are for absolute freedom of expression and press, and so forth, but I do not believe that we advocate any country taking steps if such steps would result in social chaos, and thus be incapable of reaching the goals which we want." [9]

The Administration refrained from public comment when martial law was declared on May 20. According to reports by Human Rights Watch, Administration sources did indicate that President Bush sent private messages to Deng Xiaoping, urging him not to use force against the students, but it was unclear with what strength those messages were conveyed.[10] But in what would prove to be a major thorn in the Sino-US relations during and post Tiananmen Square, democracy activist Professor Fang Lizhi was given protection from Chinese authorities in the aftermath of June 3rd and 4th in the Beijing US embassy. This was a source of extreme irritation to the Chinese authorities which the Bush Administration attempted to minimize by not acknowledging Fang’s presence in the succeeding months and even when he was nominated for peace awards.

Towards the end of June, Chinese party elders had regained control and were highly visible as thousands were detained and executions of student leaders began. Intelligence reports suggested that rivalries within the Chinese politburo were increasing. The economy was on a rapid decline, with inflation out of control and analysts were predicting a large foreign exchange deficit in the months after Tiananmen. Foreign investments were drying up and an economic stagnation was seen by most as inevitable.[11]

References:
[1] Age of Uncertainty, The US China Japan triangle from Tiananmen (1989) to 9/11 (2005), Erza F Vogel, Yuan Ming, Akihiko Tanaka, Harward university Asia Centre, 2002
[2] www.cbsnews.com
[3]Mobilization in the 1989 Student Movement: A Signaling Game, University of Michigan, Danie Stockmann
[4] Beijing Spring, pp. 315-316
[5] "Main Points of Yang Shangkun’s Speech at Emergency Enlarged Meeting of the Central Military Commission," Ming Pao (Enlightenment) (Hong Kong), May 29, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 320-327
[6] Beijing Television Service, June 6, 1989, Reprinted in Beijing Spring, pp. 363-376.
[7] http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/heroes/zhao.html
[8] Revolution's Dark Legacy, Asiaweek, Jonathan Mirsky, January 19, 2001
[9] Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/, Press Releases
[10] Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/, Press Releases
[11] State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Status Report on Situation in China as of July 26, 1989"

© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005