On June 3rd and 4th, 1989 Chinese troops stormed the symbolic heart of China to disperse what remained of thousands of demonstrators protesting the government in Tiananmen Square. What began as a student movement to mourn the death of Hu Yaobang, the former general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and demand reform within the country, ended in a bloody crackdown and the deaths of thousands of students, Beijing citizens, blue collar workers and soldiers of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). The CCP leadership’s strategy in the lead-up to the Tiananmen crackdown was to ignore the student movement until it grew to massive proportions, later attempt dialogue with the students and almost 45 days later declare martial law, when citizens, unions and blue collar workers seemed to overtake the agenda. As student leaders called for an end to the protests in Tiananmen and began to disperse, on the night of June 2nd, unarmed troops began to attempt to clear the few thousand that remained but were driven back by the city’s residents. The CCP finally resorted to a bloody crackdown on the demonstrators, sending tanks and heavily armed soldiers into the city where they shot their way into the square, mercilessly clearing it.
The episode might have passed un-noticed by Western nations if not for the live broadcasts of the confrontation by the international media, which was in Beijing to cover the state visit of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. The globally broadcast images of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, created an international furor against what were perceived to be China’s human rights abuses. But, the CCP stood by it’s stance that the demonstrations were de-stabilizing, unpatriotic and counter-revolutionary. The CCP claimed that the demonstrations were aimed at overthrowing the Peoples Republic of China and its socialist system and international media reports on the number of deaths and sequence of actions by the party were baseless. China viewed the incident as an internal matter and refused to allow any nation to influence their course of action after the incident. But the images of protesting students being beaten, shot and possibly persecuted, created immense pressure within the United States to react and protest the CCP’s actions. Despite his personal affinity to the Chinese, and under pressure from US citizens, the US Congress and the Senate, US President George Bush issued the first sanctions in the world against China. But, the Bush Administration silently also kept the back door channels of communication open with the Chinese leadership during the period, fearing a complete breakdown in the burgeoning fragile relations between the two countries.
Recreating the Tiananmen Square incident by using “A Framework of Analysis,” by Michael Brecher, this article will attempt to study the reactions, perceptions and policy processes of China and the US toward each other, during and after the episode. This will require the classification and explanation of the operational and psychological environment of both countries and the relationship between the two environments to determine the effectiveness of decisions taken by both sides. This relationship of the two environments, according to Brecher provides a technique to measure success in foreign policy decisions. If the decision makers perceive the operational environment accurately, their decisions will be rooted in reality. If this is not the case, the gap between the elite defined objectives and policy outcomes will cause those decisions to be unsuccessful.
[1]Like all systems of action, the foreign policy system comprises an environment or setting, a group of actors, structures through which they initiate decisions and respond to challenges, and processes which sustain or alter the flow of demands and products of the system as a whole.
[2]A foreign policy system maybe likened to a flow into and out of a network of structures or institutions which perform certain functions and thereby produce decisions. These in turn feed back into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of demands on policy, policy process and products of policy.
[3]Through the Eyes of China:
Operational Environment:
The operational environment comprises two general types of variables external and internal.
[4]"It has long been argued that the socialist world will adapt to the capitalist marketplace and the future of the Pacific basin will be a triumph for market principles. But China, the Soviet Union and reformist socialist countries have a different view. Closer cooperation between leading socialist states would enable them to change the rules of the wider Pacific game. China's negotiation for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, suggests that socialist states can gain acceptance to non-socialist clubs by pretending to observe capitalist rules while remaining basically command economies."
[5] This was the global view of China in the late 1980s as the Communist led nation inched closer towards the global community. After two decades of isolation, in 1972 the US began a slow engagement policy with China under Richard Nixon. In 1979, both countries began formal diplomatic relations and opened embassies. But the Chinese leadership, the remaining elders from the Cultural Revolution, was cautious in their dealings with the United States and the rest of the world. The Chinese were well aware of their position in the Cold War as the chip that could tilt the balance of power between the super-powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. But China’s relations with the Soviet Union were cold at best. The world’s second most powerful communist country having cordial ties with the United States would keep the Pacific and Asia from becoming a power centre for the Soviet bloc.
The Chinese people were fiercely inward looking and the government was opaque, a characteristic still firmly rooted in the Chinese system.
[6] But with growing economic reforms being put in place by the CCP, encouraged by CCP Chairman Deng Xiaoping, China was also becoming an economic powerhouse. A 10 year project of economic reform and engagement with the West led to rapid international investments with China gearing for further economic reforms. This transformation movement by the CCP had eased many worries in the West and discussions were fast and furious about the consequences of allowing China entry into the GATT.
In the study of the subordinate system of intermediate levels of interactions namely those of China and it’s neighboring countries, China in 1989 was seen to be improving its relations with the Soviet Union. China and the Soviet Union had cut off relations in 1963 and Gorbachev’s State visit just days before the Tiananmen Square crackdown were aimed at normalizing relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union had seized over 3 million square kilometers of Chinese territory (Outer Mongolia and North East China) after World War II and had returned only North East China in the years that followed. The Chinese were also bitter about the post World War II Yalta conference when in the eyes of the Chinese, the US and the Soviet Union had attempted to divide China. The Chinese were also attempting to normalize embittered relations with Japan while the question of the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia still hung over the Chinese Leadership.
[7] Taiwan was a source of constant friction while the PRC maintained close military ties with North Korea and had close ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
While Economic growth in the new millennium may have changed China’s global political standing, its domestic structure is still similar to what existed in 1989. Tiananmen and its aftermath cracked open the shutters on one of the most secretive political systems in the world.
[8] State power within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is wielded by the CCP, the State, and the Army. The PRC is an
oligarchy where a culturally and geographically vast country is ruled by the leadership of the CCP, the State and the Army. Central government leaders build consensus for new policies among party members, local and regional leaders, influential non-party members, and the population at large. However, control is often maintained over the larger group through the manipulation of information,
propaganda and
censorship. In 1989, ‘the elders’, the remaining leaders of the Cultural Revolution were still central to all decision making processes of the CCP’s standing committee. The CCP’s highest body is the
Party Congress, which is supposed to meet at least once every 5 years. The party elects the
Central Committee under which the primary organs of the CCP function. The organs include the
Politburo Standing Committee, the
Politburo, the Secretariat, the
Central Military Commission and the Discipline Inspection Commission.
The primary organs of state power are the
National People's Congress (NPC), the
President, and the
State Council. Members of the State Council include the Premier, a variable number of vice premiers, state councilors, 29 ministers and heads of State Council Commissions. The NPC is the highest organ of state power in China approving major new policy directions, laws, the budget, and major personnel changes. Most national legislation in the PRC is adopted by the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. Most initiatives are presented to the NPC for consideration by the State Council after previous endorsement by the Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee.
While explaining the internal variables of the Chinese Operational environment, it must be remembered that the Chinese Army or the PLA’s actions were a shock to the people of China. "No Chinese can explain the savagery of the 27th Army-why the army of the people turned into the killers of the people, leaving thousands dead. This was not only unexpected, but also a departure from the traditional behavior of an army which owed its success to its relationship with the people."
[9] The PLA combined power balance politics and it’s role as a modern national army with top army personnel holding high CCP ranks and taking part in political decision-making. "Power cliques are generated from within by operational structure of the PLA. Promotions have been based on sponsorship by higher-ranking officers. A network of career obligations emerged in which each high-ranking officer had his own pyramid of men owing loyalty to him. These networks often had a regional component; military-region commanders played major roles in promotions of officers serving in 'their' units. Both Mao and Deng Xiaoping realized the danger inherent in this, and undertook occasional rotations of military-region commanders to prevent development of strong power bases around the PLA."
[10] Despite the precautions taken by CCP elders, units had special relationships with top leaders and inevitably followed their lead in the political stance they took. The military was and continues to be an independent structure answerable to the top leadership only through the Central Military Commission.
[11] Although hard-liners seemed to have the upper hand in China in the aftermath of Tiananmen, moderates remained a potent political force. The reason, quite simply, was that they were backed strongly by the military, and the military in 1989 became the strongest political force in the country.
[12] The one official position that Deng Xiaoping had not relinquished in 1989, was the same one that Mao Zedong relied on to maintain ultimate authority during the Cultural Revolution – the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission. The position allowed Deng complete control over the armed forces with no interference from the Party Chairman, Premier or the Minister of Defense.
Although the leaders occupied distinct official posts in a triad of organizations – the ruling CCP, the State Council (the government cabinet) and the Central Military Commission, behind the scenes they functioned as a small and informal group of 10 decision makers and their staff. They were joined in their deliberations at crucial moments by the eight ‘Elders,’ China’s powerful extra-constitutional final court of appeal. Three of the elders were the most influential and the final say among them, belonged to Deng Xiaoping.
[13] The Chinese leadership was factionalized, and this factionalism was central to creating the concept of the supreme leader, Deng Xiaoping. But while Deng’s power was not absolute, with two other party Elders having strong voices in the decision making process, his role was extra-constitutional, but not illegitimate.
In the Chinese system, there are no horizontal organs, courts or legislatures, with institutionalized powers to resolve deadlocks. The big issues are extruded upward and create the pressure for someone to take ultimate responsibility. The decision to use force to resolve the Tiananmen Square demonstration was the result of this.
[14]But outside this power triangle were various other interest groups: mainly the Chinese intelligentsia, worker’s unions and the student community. During the process of reform, from 1979 to 1989, the government had been tolerant and had sported a relatively lax attitude towards the student movement which was pushing for reforms on the political side as well as the economic. The student movement shared many of its goals and language with the CCP. “But by bringing their slogans off the campuses into Tiananmen Square, the centre of the capital city, the students further thumbed their noses at Party control. Still, most of them stayed within the bounds of certain pieties, acknowledging Party leadership and positioning themselves as respectful, if disappointed supporters of the Party’s long term reform project.”
[15]Another Chinese interest group was that of the Intelligentsia. They were successful artists and literati who doubled as party cadres, publishers and university department heads, the “backbone of society.” These academics did not want the ‘western’ version of democracy, but an increase in the levels of political freedom accorded to the Chinese people. In later years, many of those who supported the student demonstrations in 1989 said, “Frankly speaking, the life we're leading today has far surpassed the extent of freedom we imagined back then. In the history of China, I'm afraid; the people have never been so open and free. The Western world has no way of understanding this."
[16]In 1989, the primary supporters of the government consisted of rural peasants who had seen their incomes increase considerably during the 1980's as a result of the Deng Xiaoping reforms. However, this support was limited in usefulness because rural peasants were distributed across the countryside. In contrast to urban dwellers that were organized into schools and work units, peasant supporters of the government remained largely unorganized and difficult to mobilize.
The second group consisted of urban industrial workers, who believed that the CCP’s reforms had gone too far. The loosening economic controls had begun to cause
inflation and
unemployment which threatened their livelihood. Without independent unions or peasant associations to protect their interests, workers were dissatisfied and pushing the CCP to address concerns over corruption, unemployment and economic disparities.
The demonstrations of Tiananmen Square were an ‘Anomic Outburst’ into the political system, where latent discontent was sparked by the death of formal General Secretary Hu Yaobang leading to student protests that quickly became demonstrations that threatened the CCP.
With no competing elite’s to vie for authority to make political decisions within the system and offer alternative general sets, interest groups with specific policy demands would have to present them to the same single party authoritarian system. This is what happened in the lead up to the crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square. Pressures on policy were handled by the competing factions within the CCP, the Standing Committee and the Elders, leading to many who protested the harshness of Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng’s methodology to end the protests being ousted from the Party and those who supported the decision, moving up the ranks of the CCP.
While the operational environment, exists independent of it’s perception by decision makers, it can have an impact on the foreign policy process only to the extent that it is communicated to the elite.
[17] The Central leadership displayed a voracious appetite for raw information. The intelligence flow was impressive in terms of quantity but less so for analysis. The two security ministries provided a flow of information through the day on events. The CCP’s official news agency which is also an intelligence service, ‘Xinhua News Agency’ provided extensive coverage within China and foreign reactions to Chinese events. It is striking that in an authoritarian police state such as China, its leaders were keen to keep close tabs on public opinion. Domestic intelligence was frank and informative. They were mercilessly honest about the ideological doubts in the population but were long on incident and short on analysis. This allowed many leaders to continue to believe that the mass uprising resulted from manipulation by a tiny minority.
Psychological Environment:
It is also of utmost importance to identify the person(s) and/or group(s) whose images of the operational environment shape decisions. The decision making elite in this case was China’s Supreme Leader Deng Xiaoping. Additionally the seven other Elders, CCP leader Zhao Ziyang, Premier Li Peng and the members of the Standing Committee had an influence on the information flow to Deng. Each had their own agenda, opinion and stance, leading to a break in the leadership. While Zhao was against the use of force and wanted to negotiate peacefully with the students, Li was adamant that the student movement was being hijacked by a few and needed to be confronted and put down. Any concession according to him would seriously undermine the prestige of the government and of Deng’s authority. This deadlock had to be taken to Deng, who sided with Li and along with the Elders decided to fire Zhao and replace him with Li Peng.
Every decision maker operates within a context of psychological pre-dispositions. In this case, Deng Xiaoping was a leader steeped in the philosophies and learning from the Cultural Revolution. As he described himself, he was “the core of the second generation of CCP leadership.” While he changed numerous facets of how China functioned, internally and with the rest of the world, he still held close the belief that the third generation of the CCP needed to win the people’s trust and achieve tangible results. He held the view that China could not return to its isolation. China’s long history of being dominated and subjugated by conquering powers had made him and other CCP leaders wary of interaction with the West, viewing the US as a hegemonic power that could over-run China and East Asia by influencing the region’s policies. But Deng also had close relations with US President George Bush and recognized that to sustain the pace of economic reform, interaction with the West was essential.
An impulsive decision maker,
[18] Deng’s vision of political reform was limited, but his view of economic reform and the subsequent opening up to the West wasn’t. He was a firm believer in the sovereignty of the Chinese people and considered any external interference within China as an outrage. The decisions and actions of the CCP against student protesters was an internal matter and Deng ensured that that viewpoint was communicated clearly to the West. As US sanctions came into effect, in the aftermath of Tiananmen, Deng’s perception of reality and not reality itself took over. He felt that various aspects of US Foreign Policy had cornered China, that the US was basing its decisions on rumors and that if a country was to formulate it’s policies on the basis of such, the Government of that country would suffer to a great extent.
[19] He was of the view that the demonstrations had been counter-revolutionary and aimed at overthrowing the PRC and that controlling such traitorous behavior was the inherent and legal right of the PRC. “The cause of the differences between our two countries was not because China had offended or impinged upon US interests. It was the US which on a large scale impinged upon Chinese interests and had injured Chinese dignity. With regard to how to resolve the issue, there is a Chinese proverb – it is up to the person who tied the knot to untie it. It is our hope that in its future course of action the US will seek to untie the knot.”
[20]Process:
When troops were dispatched on June 3rd and met resistance from demonstrators, on June 4th, Li Peng and the Standing Committee called them ‘rioters’ who were brazen and lawless. Xiaoping wanted Tiananmen Square cleared before June 5th and stated that troops were to be reasonable with the students and resort to ‘all means necessary’ only when all else failed. Further orders were for the PLA to be seen as standing with the people and not shedding any blood within the Square. The battle on the 4th was kept outside the Square and no blood was shed in the Square. Firmness with the ‘counter-revolutionaries’ and prevention of the destabilization of Chinese security also meant the decision to prosecute and kill the leaders of the ‘rebellion.’ To prevent the outbreak of a similar riot or even a potential ‘civil war’ Deng Xiaoping wanted the rumors of the number of deaths to be quashed. He believed that the American News Service, Voice of America was at the forefront of spreading the ‘rumors’ and suspended their operations in China. According to Deng, “the Chinese people will never tolerate any behavior that violates international norms, nor will they bend under pressure. Our use of martial law to deal with the turmoil was absolutely necessary. In the future we will use severe measures to stamp out the first signs of turmoil as they appear. This will show we don’t put up with foreign interference and will protect our national sovereignty.”
[21] But Deng was clear that while the PRC would strongly prosecute those who had attempted to subvert the Party, students were to be forgiven and not tracked down. But all demonstrations, assemblies, news reports, marches etc were to be controlled and suppressed. When the US suspended all exchanges of military and diplomatic personnel, China reciprocated.
During the early days after the Tiananmen Square incident, Deng was clear, “We don’t care what others say about us; all we care about is a peaceful environment for our own development. We won’t close any doors; our biggest lesson from the past has been not to isolate ourselves from the world.”
[22]The Chinese were on a firm road to Economic reform prior to Tiananmen, though inflation and corruption had taken a toll in the process. Post Tiananmen, Deng had a harder time re-starting economic reforms. Party hardliners felt that the reforms had led students to a more capitalist thought process and had exposed them to Western concepts of political reform. But Economic reforms did take centre-stage. The Party Central and State Council were given the authority to put specific long term plans targeted towards growth, infrastructure, small and big enterprises and resource development. Corruption within the Party cadres was made a priority even as external aid to China had almost completely stopped. In June multi-lateral banks, led by the US along with other nations halted all loans to China and the US also put restrictions on Chinese exports.
On June 9th, 1989, Deng stated in a public appearance that “Right now international public opinion is raging against us, but we can take it; we won’t let them get to us. The recent events have brought our mistakes into the open. Only socialism can save China and turn it into a developed country. China has no future outside the socialist road.”
[23] His biggest fear was that if China buckled under international pressure, it would always be someone’s satellite country, something that the Chinese feared most after the 150 years of subjugation they had faced after the Opium Wars.
When the US violated its own sanction against official visits and sent Brent Scowcroft as President Bush’s emissary to Deng, he was clearly told in response to US sanctions that, “It is an old saying in China that emotion is no substitute for policy.”
[24] But it was also clear through the meeting that in its effort to ensure the meeting occurred; the Chinese were as interested as the Americans, not to obliterate the relations the two had built due to Tiananmen
Through the Eyes of the United States:
Operational Structure:
In 1989, towards the end of the Cold War, the United States saw a new President take office. The world that the Bush Administration encountered was one of bi-polar super powers that had existed since the end of World War 2. 1989 saw the US and the Soviet Union, reaching out towards each other with hesitant hands of friendship, while the Cold War memories and attitudes still made both cautious towards each other. The world was still divided into two blocs and China was the key to the control of Asia by either the Communists or the Capitalists. Since 1972, when President Nixon re-started relations with China, the US had been attempting to ensure that the Soviet Bloc did not win any friends on the Chinese side. During President Reagan’s tenure, US-Soviet relations had improved considerably due to the efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev and Reagan. Relations between the two had begun on the assumption that the Soviet Union was an “Evil Empire” and attempts were made through economic and arms build ups to trigger the Soviet Union to collapse, but in later years, Reagan and Bush came to believe firmly in Gorbachev’s ‘Perestroika’.
[25] In1989, the world was on the brink of the end of the Cold War and the US was attempting to become the only remaining super power. In his inaugural speech in January 1989, President George Bush told the citizens of the US, “Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the door to freedom. Men and women of the world move toward free markets through the door to prosperity.” That was the key to all diplomatic and military relation that the US engaged in – Trade.
In the 1980’s China’s Supreme leader Deng Xiaoping had embarked on a new economic reform effort. To many observers including those in the US Administration this appeared to be a move towards liberalization but at the same time the Administration recognized the fact that at no time did Xiaoping offer any fundamental political reform.
Internally, President Bush took over a country that was in a relative peaceful and prosperous phase. He was the commander-in-chief of the US Armed forces which was an essential deterrence factor as well as one of the most important negotiating factors for the US in its diplomatic efforts. The PLA and the US army had a number of exchanges of military personnel for training and regularly sold arms and technology to the Chinese.
The US is the world's largest energy producer, consumer, and net importer. It also ranks eleventh worldwide in reserves of oil, sixth in natural gas, and first in coal. Between 1972 and 1988, the US and China had become major trading partners, each contributing over 10 percent to the other's total trade figures. Major US corporations such as IBM, Boeing and Chrysler along with hundreds of smaller firms had made major investment commitments to China. The range of products sourced in China steadily grew as US investors saw significant opportunities in China.
The world’s largest consumer was also the founder of the concept of democracy. The political structure remains the same as it was in 1989 and before. The President is both the Chief of State and head of government. The US Cabinet is appointed by the President with Senate approval. The US government is an elected body of representatives where the president and vice president are elected on the same ticket by a college of representatives who are elected directly from each state. The President and Vice President each serve four-year terms. The US governing system also possesses the Senate which has 100 seats, one-third are renewed every two years; two members are elected from each state by popular vote to serve six-year terms and the House of Representatives with 435 seats where members are directly elected by popular vote to serve two-year terms. There are two competing political parties within this governing democratic system, the Republican Party, Democratic Party, and the Independent candidates who belong to neither party. The country has a strong independent judiciary, and has as its supreme judiciary body, the Supreme Court which is the final word on the judicial character of the country. Its nine justices are appointed for life on condition of good behavior by the president with confirmation by the Senate. The country’s other judicial arms are the United States Courts of Appeal; United States District Courts; State and County Courts which follow a federal court system based on English common law. Each state has its own unique legal system, of which all but one (Louisiana's) is based on English common law.
[26]Towards the end of the Cold war, two issues loomed large in the relationship between the US and China: human rights and Taiwan. After Tiananmen, Robert L. Suettinger author of Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 argues, "The bilateral relationship lost its insulation from domestic politics." This is not a trivial insight. Lacking a sophisticated understanding of the forces influencing the policy process of the other, neither country has been very successful at anticipating the other's policies or foreseeing likely responses to its own initiatives. Chinese bellicosity toward Taiwan had only strengthened the hand of those in the United States most eager to expand Washington's defense commitment to Taipei.
[27] Human Rights activists such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International to name a few were also lobbying hard for a more stringent US response. Human Rights watchers were extremely disappointed by what they perceived as a muted response by the Bush Administration and attempted to influence the decision making elite through its opposition and through the Congress. The Congress then attempted a number of sanctions against China which were vetoed by the President, while the Opposition pressurized the President to withdraw the US Ambassador to China and break all diplomatic ties with the country.
The communication flow from China to the Bush Administration, which the Chinese believed to be incomplete and inaccurate, was startlingly continuous and varied. It included cables from the US Ambassador in China, CIA intelligence reports, intelligence reports from operatives of other nations within China, global media reports and eye-witness accounts of US students and other citizens in Beijing. As the day to day crisis came to an end, through the month of June, the Administration relied heavily on its diplomatic mission and the CIA to provide a day to day account of the CCP Leadership’s decision making. Initially, the reports were varied and as George Bush put it, “the reports are still crazy; there are rumors that Li Peng has been shot and that Deng was dead. All this tells me to be cautious and be calm.” As the reports became more accurate, the Administration reacted with the placing of sanctions.
Psychological Environment:
George Bush had a keen personal interest in China, understood the Chinese perception to a greater deal than most and had close relations with many Chinese leaders. He had been the US’s UN Ambassador and although he had worked to preserve Taiwan’s position at the UN under the Nixon Administration was close to China’s UN representative. He later was posted to China as the American liaison officer, as the US did not have an embassy in China at that time. He spent a year, learning the Chinese culture, its leaders and as he became the President was keen on reviewing and enhancing Sino-American relations. He used the opportunity of attending the funeral of Emperor Hirohito of Japan to justify a trip to China where he met Deng in the first few months of his Presidency. He had developed his friendship with Deng during his tenure as Ronald Reagan’s Vice President and continued that friendship as President. He believed through frank conversations, the Chinese would realize the US’s intentions of developing trust between the two nations.
[28]Elite images of the operational environment in the US changed drastically after Tiananmen. The military crackdown shattered much of the goodwill that had been built through economic reforms by the Chinese in the West. The incident re-iterated in the minds of many that the reforms had been a sham.
[29] The view of China being an autocratic dictatorship where human rights were not on the Government’s agenda gained a strong international voice. Even as the Bush Administration attempted to react moderately to the incident in order to not derail Sino-US relations, in the days after Tiananmen as the Chinese leadership began its crackdown on Student Leaders, there was a clamor among the Senate and the Congress for stronger action. Both advocated a radical move against China and many suggested that the US close its Chinese Embassy thereby cutting all formal diplomatic relations with China.
Process:
The Bush administration wanted to send a clear communiqué that the Chinese military crackdown was unacceptable to the Administration, the Congress, the Senate and the American people. But at the same time the Distraction wanted the response to be measured, not wanting to punish the Chinese people for the actions of their government, nor damage tenuous ties with the ruling communists. According to Bush, ‘he believed that the commercial contact between the US and China had helped lead to the quest for more freedom.’ This was the reason behind the Administration not cutting off all ties as Congress was demanding, with China. Instead the Bush Administration suspended military sales and contact with the Chinese Leadership. To President Bush it was important that the Chinese leaders understood that it could not be business as usual until the US saw the PLA restrain itself.
[30] According to Bush,” We had to remain involved, engaged with the Chinese government, if we were to have any influence or leverage to work for restraint and cooperation let alone for human rights and democracy. While angry rhetoric might be temporarily satisfying to some, I believed it would deeply hurt our efforts in the long run.”
[31]Bush recognized the fact that the Chinese were extremely sensitive to anything that might appear to be interference in their internal affairs and time again stressed the objections of the American people to the events of Tiananmen as that protests on the grounds of the moral values of the Americans. It was the first nation to announce sanctions against China, which included the suspension of weapon sales, suspension of visits by US and Chinese military and government officials, sympathetic reviews of Chinese students in the US to extend their stay and the offer of humanitarian assistance through the Red Cross to those injured during the assaults.
Despite the clamor for serious sanctions against China pressurizing him domestically and despite his sanctions on the Chinese Leadership, President Bush kept the backdoor channels of communication open. Immediately after Tiananmen, he attempted to speak to Deng directly, but could not get through to him. He kept in contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Washington and finally, going against his own sanction against any visits by government officials, he sent a personal emissary in the form of Brent Scowcroft to Deng, to explain why the US needed to react to what the Chinese assumed were internal matters and how he would be forced to toughen his stance if the Chinese did not relent. Within a matter of a month, the US reacted to the incident, placed sanctions against China and then showed its intent on maintaining ties by sidelining the very sanctions it put in place.
What the model doesn’t let you do:
In the study of China and the United States foreign policies during the Tiananmen Square incident using Michael Brecher’s Framework of Analysis, some flaws in the original framework, do injustice to a number of influential factors. In the study of the psychological environment, the theory leans heavily towards the attitudinal prism of a single decision maker. It also does not take into account within the operational environment the factionalization of a single party authoritarian regime. Both of these missing factors played a key role, in the build up and eventual actions taken by China. Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziang, Li Peng, CCP Elders Chen Yun, and Peng Zhen’s roles were critical in influencing the decision making processes of Deng Xiaoping. The theory falls into the trap of simplifying the role of the Supreme Leader and his ideologies and does not take into account that the attitudinal prism of other leaders and their factionalization and power play were critical in the decisions that were taken. The demands of one group led by Chen Yun and Peng Zhen who feared that weakening Party control could encourage ideological and social disorder, made Deng step up ideological propaganda. The ideological and power struggle between Zhao and Li were also critical in the decisions taken prior to and post the Tiananmen Square incident.
The flaw in the model is less obvious when using the model to describe the US reaction to the event. While President Bush takes precedence in the decision making process, it is hard to inculcate his “Ex-comm” in the model. It allows one to take into consideration the build up of reactions in the operating environment of pressure groups, competing elites and others, but does not allow for a situation where a newly elected leader is also attempting to make his position within the domestic political sphere stronger. The model also does not allow for the friction within a newly formed team around the leader, which may influence the leader since he belongs to a democratic country which also has a democratic internal set-up.
On an overall basis, I believe that Michael Brecher’s ‘Framework of Analysis’ allows us to observe to a greater extent than most models, the process of decision making. Allowing for the initial separation of the operational environment and its later integration with the psychological environment allows a perspective of how the various facets of a crisis play upon the ultimate decisions and processes. The only flaw in Brecher’s model as I observe is, his heavy tilt towards assuming and playing up the biases of the Leaders and not each of the persons or situations that may tilt the biases of the Leader.
[1] The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Chapter 1 Framework of Analysis, Michael Brecher, Yale University Press, 1972
[2] The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Setting, Images, Process, Michael Brecher, New Haven Yale University Press, 1972
[3] The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Setting, Images, Process, Michael Brecher, New Haven Yale University Press, 1972
[4] The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Setting, Images, Process, Michael Brecher, New Haven Yale University Press, 1972
[5] International Herald Tribune, Gerald Segal, 5/19/1989, pg 4
[6] Chinese Perspectives on International Relations, Gerald Chan, St Martin’s Press, 1999
[7] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[8] Long Live the thought of Mao Zedong, 1967 and 1969, mimeographed volume reproductions
[9] San Jose Mercury News, Yu Bin, pg 11B, 06/09/1989
[10] Christian Science Moniter, Harvey Nelson, pg 19, 06/15/1989
[11] Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[12] International Herald Tribune, Harlan W Jencks, pg 8, 06/21/1989
[13] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[14] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[15] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[16] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[17] The Foreign Policy System of Israel, Chapter 1 Framework of Analysis, Michael Brecher, Yale University Press, 1972
[18] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[19] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[20] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[21] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[22] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[23] The Tiananmen Papers, Zang Liang, Andrew J Nathan and Perry Link, Public Affairs, New York, 2001
[24] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[25] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[26] http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Govt
[27] Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US-China Relations, 1989-2000, Robert L Suettinger, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003
[28] http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/
[29] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[30] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
[31] A World Transformed, George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, Alfred A Knopf, Inc, New York, 1998
© All Rights Reserved Maithreyi Seetharaman 2005
